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Abstract.  Signs of the crisis of the Hungarian agriculture are in relation with the economic and social model that has 
become rigid throughout the past two decades. The evolved structure of agricultural holdings the networks among 
the farmers have been restructured as well as have become losen. The degree of trust has decreased. Based on the 
principles of the modern economic schools, e.g. the game theory, the study examines how the existing trust level 
among farmers affects the farmers’ preferences of choice among the different forms of dependencies, as well as which 
factors affect the individual utility functions, focused on the role of subsidies from the social transaction costs. Due 
to the information asymmetry between farmers and the lack of confidence, the individual and the social expenditures 
are higher than economically justifable. Based on a simulation model the paper examines the payoffs of the farms as 
well as the community from the point of view of machinery use and investment strategies.
Introduction
The transition from the socialist regime has basically reconstructed the ownership conditions and property 
structure of the arable land in most of the Central-Eastern European countries. [Takács-György et al. 2008]. In 
addition to the changes in ownership, the farm scales have also been modified and the landed property struc-
ture has diversified. [Takács-György, Sadowski 2005]. The new property structure has resulted in significant 
alterations in land use and high number of small-scale, divided farms have emerged. Limitation of the land 
market preserves [Magda 2001], permanently maintains the diversified estate structure in a sense. The technical 
requirements under the new conditions impose great challenges to the farmers as well as to the government. 
The social-economic processes, the economic and social tensions make it clear that new problems 
require the development of new structures which consider the economic, social and environmental in-
terests of the local communities, as well as their sustainability. 
Analysing this problem the paper focuses on the game theory, using the models for supporting the 
economic decisions and explaining the reasons for the real processes, in order to find scientific explana-
tions for the attitudes of local communities in connection with cooperation [Takács 2003; Baranyai 2009]. 
Supposing that the general aspects and features are widely known, the paper focuses on the aspects 
of the question that can help to find the reasons (and necessity) of machinery sharing arrangements or 
the lack of cooperation (and economic rationality behind this decision) among farmers, who are the main 
targets of our research. 
The prisoner’s dilemma, or the implementation of game theory  
in exploring the problems
From the aspect of game theory, the economic processes can be regarded as the game of two or more 
players, who make decisions in the game [Kreps 2005]. The explanatory models usually start from the 
point that the decision is rational (the player is homo economicus) and identical decisions can be expected 
because the condition system remains unchanged. Decision of farmers about cooperation is determined 
by the information asymmetries among them on the one hand and by the different experiences of the 
participants on the other hand. Regarding this as the principle of the tit for tat affects [Axelrod 1984], i.e. 
acquiring as well as keeping the trust, which was discussed earlier, is more difficult as its loss.
Starting from the non-cooperative game theory, the implementation of the normal form is prioritized 
in the research. According to the non-cooperative game theory, the players make decisions independently, 
thus there is no self-restraint during decision-making, everybody aims to maximize his/her own profit. It 
is not indifferent whether the decision-maker knows the decision of the other player or not. The normal 
form is appropriate for describing the decisions made simultaneously (in the lack of knowing the other’s 
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decision), while the extensive form – that is not used in this paper – as a decision tree, the graphic descrip-
tion of decisions, in which the subsequence of decisions appear, too, due to the features of description. 
The normal form is the description of players’ payoffs in a matrix (P), which gives the due pairs of 
payoffs of strategy pairs. (Fig. 1, Equation  1).
The rows show the strategies of player one (A in this case), while the columns show the strategies of 
the other player (B in this case). The result of the rational selection is that the player chooses the option 
that offers higher payoff (profit). Therefore there are balanced decision pairs called Nash equilibriums. 
The point in Nash equilibrium is that the player follows the strategy that is the best for him/her (results 
the highest payoff) until the other player does not change his/her own best strategy and vice versa. 
The researchers of the game theory have studied a lot of cases and developed the „games” as the basis of 
economic modelling. In our research – considering the decisions of machinery use or machinery investments 
– we tried to find games, which meet the following conditions: two players are involved, each player has two 
possible strategies, the players do not have the perfect information and it is not zero sum game. There are 
several games that meet these criteria: Battle of the sexes, Chicken (aka hawk-dove), Deadlock, Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, Stag hunt and War of attrition. The Prisoner’s Dilemma was chosen in the explanatory model. 
The Prisoners’ Dilemma is a well-known model about the trust in the partner. If the two players 
trusted each other it would be the most rewarding (as well as Pareto efficient) for them. But, because of 
the information asymmetry, most probably both parties confess against the other, then both of them are 
sentenced, but still for less than the longest sentence, due to the cooperation with the authorities. The 
Nash equilibriums of the game, if one of the parties betrays, the other remains silent, while because both 
players – supposedly – considers the possibilities similarly, and none of them trusts that the other chooses 
to remain silent, therefore he/she betrays. Since it can be supposed that both of them acts the same, the 
actual sum of their ’payoff” is the least beneficial. And though they know that the most beneficial would be 
for them to trust each other, since they are afraid that the trust is not mutual, they choose the solution – as 
a damage minimization – which is not favourable for them but still it is not the least favourable solution. 
Because of the risks and information asymmetries in the machinery sharing arrangements the farmers 
(as the players of the game of prisoners’ dilemma) choose the non-optimum solution. At the cooperation 
in machinery using, on the one hand, machine-related moral hazard [Holmstrom, Milgrom 1994, Allen, 
Lueck 2002] as well as labour risk hazard [Holmstrom 1982, Eswarten, Kotwal 1985] could be identi-
fied, and on the other hand the time has importance in agricultural production. The actions carried out 
earlier or later than the due time involve extra costs or losses (profit losses) [Edwards, Boehle 1980], i.e. 
timeliness cost [Short, Gitu 1991; Larsen 2008]. 
The experiences prove that the joint machinery sharing arrangements may result in the loss or forced 
surrender of independence, image losses, sometimes professional jealousy or envy, which can often be 
led back to the generation gap and the farmer’s pride. [Haag 2004] According to the Hungarian experi-
ences, the negative aspects of machinery sharing arrangements include the increasing dependence of the 
individual and the pressure to consult before decisions or actions [Takács 2003].
Materials and methods
During the research a model was developed by adapting the game theory models and examined the 
investment decisions of field crops farms from game theory aspects. On the basis of the data of survey 
documented by Baranyai [2009] and data of basis farm system by Gockler [2012] the parameters of 
the model were outlined in which each of the two players participates with two possible cooperation 
strategies (Tab. 1). The number of actual players, of course, is significantly higher, but in most cases the 
players can be divided into two sets (those owning machinery and performing machine investments, and 
those not having and not wanting machinery). These two groups can be substituted with two players. The 
payoffs of the players come from the balance of the possible income (production, services, land-based 
B
or in matrix form P = [ a1,1 ;  b1,1        a1,2 ;  b1,2a2,1 ;  b2,1        a2,2 ;  b2,2 ]                   (3)
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Figure 1.  Payoffs of players described in table, according to the normal form
Rysunek 1. Wypłaty dla graczy w postaci normalnej 
Source: own study
Źródło: opracowanie własne
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subsidy given to the producers in some models), costs 
(variable costs of production: fertilizer, pesticide, 
etc., variable costs of machine use; variable costs of 
machinery services, divided permanent cost of asset 
use (amortization); and the opportunity cost of land 
use). Four variants of the models were examined in 
order to analyse how the subsidies affect the farmer’s 
decisions and the observed fact, according to which 
the farmers usually calculate with the return of the 
actually risked, own financial means disregarding 
the subsidies received for the investment. The model 
variants are as follows:
1) without land-based subsidy and amortization-re-
ducing factors (basic case),
2) with land-based subsidy, without amortization-
-reducing factors,
3) with land-based subsidy, factor that reduces amor-
tization: subsidy,
4) with land-based subsidy, factor that reduces amor-
tization: subsidy + residual value.
The calculation of the payoff is made with equation (2), according to which the payoff vector is the 
product of the coefficient matrix of factors involved in the model variant (3) and (4), and the payoff factor 
vector (5). The payoff vector (6) gives the net output of players by strategy pairs. 
Based on these equations the impacts of changing rate of players having the same strategy to the payoffs 
were analysed by a simulation model. Scenarios were counted at different capacity surpluses comparing to 
the equipped farm demand. The values of capacity surpluses based on Takács and Bojar [2003] experiences.
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Table 1. Strategies of the players 
Tabela 1. Strategie graczy
Player/
Gracz
Strategy/
Strategia
Description of strategy/
Opis strategii
A
A1 Invests and offers services/inwestuje i świadczy usługi
A2
Has no equipment, does not 
invest, looks for services/nie 
ma maszyn, nie inwestuje, 
nie świadczy usług
B
B1 Invests and offers services/inwestuje i świadczy usługi
B2
Has no equipment, does not 
invest, looks for services/nie 
ma maszyn, nie inwestuje, 
nie świadczy usług
Source: own construction 
Źródło: badania własne
Table 2. Variables of the model 
Tabela 2. Zmienne w modelu
Title of variable/Zmienna Sign of variable/ 
Oznaczenie
Production value from production/wartość wytworzenia z produkcji B
p
Production value from machinery service/fee of machinery service/wartość wytworzenia z 
usług wynajmu Bs
Variable cost of production/zmienny koszt wytworzenia Cv
P
Variable cost of machine use in production/zmienny koszt maszyn w produkcji Cv
MP
Variable cost of machine services/zmienny koszt usług maszynami Cv
MS
Depreciation of machine tools/amortyzacja Cf
A
Income from land-based subsidy/dopłaty bezpośrednie BG
Depreciation of asset value reduced by subsidy/amortyzacja pomniejszona o dopłaty 
bezpośrednie Cf
A-G
Depreciation of asset value reduced by subsidy and residual value/amortyzacja pomniejszona 
o dopłaty bezpośrednie i wartość rezydualną Cf
A-G-R
Opportunity cost of land/koszty alternatywne ziemi CO
L
Source: own study
Źródło: opracowanie własne
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The model variables determining the payoff vector (Tab. 3) enabled the all-round examination of 
payoffs that provide the basis for decision. Only some of the results are introduced below due to the 
lack of space:
f1 (≡Bp)
f2 (≡Bs)
f3 (≡Cv
p)
f4 (≡Cv
MP)
f5 (≡Cv
MS)
f6 (≡Cf
A)
f7 (≡BG)
f8 (≡Cf
A–G)
f9 (≡Cf
A–G–R)
f10 (≡C0
L)
f =
 (5)     and      
p1 (A:A1 – B1)
p2 (A:A1 – B2)
p3 (A:A2 – B1)
p4 (A:A2 – B2)
p5 (B:A1 – B1)
p6 (B:A1 – B2)
p7 (B:A2 – B2)
p8 (B:A2 – B2)
p =    (6)
The coefficient matrixes of model variants are described by equation (7):
The total area of the arable lands of the modelled settlement was 3000 hectares, and the interval of 
the range of the players with same strategy was 0 to 1 (i.e. 100%), and the parameters of the other group 
were complements. 
Fee of machinery services was calculated by the function (8) as follow:
MS
vb
S C
r
AB += S                 (8)
where:
Bs – fee of machinery service, as an equilibrium price of the machine service supply and demand (HUF),
A – constant of steepness of curve (value at simulation was 10,000 HUF, estimation based on earlier 
experiences),
r – rate of Players A with strategy 1 (value was between 0 and 1 w/o dimension),
b – exponent of variable r (value was 1 w/o dimension).
Cv
MS  –  variable cost of machine services as the asymptote of the machinery service fee (HUF).
Decision function of players (9) about changing strategy or continuing production on the earlier way as follow: 
j
B
i
A
i
S
BA Tpp
i
>−=∆ )2;1(
                
(9)
where:
∆si
(A1;B2)
 – difference between the payoffs of Players A with strategy 1 and Players B with strategy 2 (HUF),
p
i
A – payoffs of Players A with strategy 1 (HUF),
p
i
B – payoffs of Players B with strategy 2 (HUF),
T
j
 – variable the cut value of player j (depending on the transaction costs of changing strategy, 
including the costs of risks) (HUF).
(7)
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Results
It gives reasonable result if the payments of A1-B2 or A2-B1 strategy pairs are analysed. The functions 
of A2-B1 strategy pairs are the mirror of the A1-B2 strategy pairs. In other cases, if all players choose 
the strategy 1 (i.e. everybody invests to machinery) there is not any occasion to cooperate, and in case all 
players choose the strategy 2 (i.e. nobody invests to machinery), despite the willingness to cooperation 
there is not any ability to cooperate. 
The payments of the scenarios of A1-B2 strategy pair are summarized in figure 2. It shows the average 
individual farm payoffs (i.e. incomes) of the two groups of players. Left part of the curves shows the cases 
when all capacity of the Players A (i.e. machinery supply) does not cover all capacity demand of Players B, 
so lots of Players B would not be able to cultivate their arable lands and they would suffer losses. As a result 
the difference between the average income of Players A and B is significant, it could exceed the transaction 
costs of the strategy changing, and it could stimulate a part of the Players B investing into farm equipment.
The optimum points of curves (see the embedded chart on figure 2) would be the maximum of the 
incomes at the community level. Theoretically before this optimum Players B have advantages though, 
because the services fee is lower than the operational costs of machinery. At the same time, analysing 
scenarios S1, S2 and S3 it could be stated that the supports decrease the impacts of the market forces, 
because the difference between the average individual (farm) incomes at the alternative strategies de-
creased under the value of transaction costs of strategy change (see 10).
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The result of it is the aggregated community level of incomes if more and more farmers make deci-
sions about investing into farm equipment, which results a lower efficiency of farm assets as well as 
unnecessary payoffs of government.
The production and investment subsidies significantly affect the actual payoffs and payoffs that 
are imagined by the farmer. The actual service sector prices result lower balance fees for services and 
relatively great income difference may occur among parties, therefore those not having machinery are 
stimulated to invest in equipment. 
Regarding machine purchases, the distributors count the second-hand machine with significant re-
sidual value (as we saw it is about 30% of the original purchase price) and many farmers take this into 
consideration in investment decisions, but not calculating with the time value of money. In case of this 
latter attitude (decision-making method) the one without machinery can increase his payoff if investing, 
which does not encourage cooperation. The optimum of the rate of the equipped farms depends on its 
capacity surpluses (Fig. 3). 
Table 3. Starting data set of the model calculations 
Tabela 3. Dane wyjściowe do modelu
Denomination of variable/Nazwa zmiennej Unit/Jedn. A B
Land size/Powierzchnia użytków ha 50 50
Crop/Uprawa cereals/zboża cereals/zboża
Yield average/Średni plon t/ha 6 6
Unit price/Cena jednostkowa 1000 HUF/t 40 40
Gross asset value/Wartość brutto aktywów mln HUF 30 30
Depreciation/Amortyzacja year/rok 6 6
Opportunity cost of land/Koszty alternatywne ziemi
1000 HUF/ha
40 40
Variable production costs without machinery/
Zmienne koszty wytworzenia bez maszyn 50 50
Variable costs of machinery/Zmienne koszty maszyn 30 30
Land-b ased subsidy/Dopłaty bezpośrednie 48 48
Subsidy ratio of machine investment/
Wskaźnik subsydiowania inwestycji w maszyny
% of 
purchase 
price/% ceny 
zakupu  
40 40
Calculated residual value of machines  in case of new purchase/
Wartość rezydualna maszyn w przypadku zakupu nowych 30 30
Fee of machinery services/Opłaty za usługi maszynami 1000 HUF/ha variable/zmienna variable/zmienna
Source: own study
Źródło: opracowanie własne
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Conclusions
The research – with the tools of game theory supporting economic analysis – tries to explore the explanatory 
factors in the investment decisions of farmers, which help to understand the low cooperation willingness of 
farmers and the impetus in most of the farmers to perform production with own machinery. It can be stated that:
1. The game theory models have confirmed that the current subsidy system affects the investment de-
cisions of farmers (as homo economicus), increases the willingness to invest and implicitly reduces 
the consideration of efficiency criteria.
2. The differences in payoffs among observed farmers (since the payoff pairs are not fair in many market 
situations) encourage the party with no equipment to invest until his payoff becomes fairly equal.
Figure 2. Payoffs of players (farms) in relation to machine service fees depending on the rate of players with 
the same strategy, by modelling the supporting impacts (Strategy of players: A –Invests and offers services; 
B – has no equipment, does not invest, looks for services (wants to cooperate)
Rysunek 2. Wynagrodzenie dla graczy (gospodarstw rolnych) w odniesieniu do cen za usługi maszynami uzależnione 
od pozycji gracza z tą samą strategią, przez modelowanie wpływu wsparcia (strategie graczy A – zainwestować i 
oferować usługi, B – brak wyposażenia, nie inwestować, nie świadczyć usług (chce współpracować)
Source: own study
Źródło: opracowanie własne
Figure 3. Aggregated payoffs of community (settlement) in relation to machine service fees depending on the 
rate of players with the same strategy, by modelling the impacts of the rate of the capacity surplus
Rysunek 3. Zagregowane wynagrodzenie społeczności w odniesieniu do opłat za wynajem maszyn uzależnione od 
pozycji graczy z tą samą strategią przez modelowanie wpływu wysokości nadwyżki mocy produkcyjnych
Source: own study
Źródło: opracowanie własne
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3. The low machine service supply, the high service fees (the relatively considerable difference between 
the yields of the two strategies and the losses of farmers because of the inadequate operation), as 
well as the current risks and individual benefits encourage investment (see the dilemma in Stag hunt: 
sure rabbit or unsure stag (deer).
4. Considering all the above – explained also with rational decisions – the Hungarian agricultural produ-
cers are in the trap of Prisoner’s dilemma and thus they fail the maximum payoff that could be realized 
together in case of efficient, well-coordinated joint machine investments and machinery sharing.
The title of the paper is reworking of a part of Hamlet’s famous monologue, but it should be realized that in 
the long run, the question of “to cooperate or not to cooperate” will in fact mean „to be or not to be” for most of 
the agricultural producers. At the same time, under the current conditions it is not the cooperation that ensures the 
highest payoff for the rationally deciding homo economicus, although the payoff is the key factor in deliberation. 
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Streszczenie
Oznaki kryzysu węgierskiego rolnictwa wynikają głównie z przyjętego modelu społecznego i gospodarczego, 
który w ostatnich dwóch dekadach został „zamrożony”. Mimo to ewoluowała struktura gospodarstw rolnych, 
zrestrukturyzowano powiązania społeczno-gospodarcze wśród rolników, szczególnie w zakresie wzajemnej współpracy. 
Ze względu na niejednakowy dostęp rolników do informacji i brak zaufania w działaniach kooperacyjnych stwierdzono, 
iż wydatki w gospodarstwach  indywidualnych i uspołecznionych są wyższe niż byłoby to ekonomicznie uzasadnione. 
Opierając się na modelu symulacyjnym podjęto próbę oceny wynagrodzenia dla indywidualnych i uspołecznionych 
gospodarstw pod kątem wykorzystania parku maszynowego i wdrażanych strategii inwestycyjnych.
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